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In the competition of a crowded curriculum
the only convincing argument that can be
made for the inclusion of a subject is
thought to be the possession by the subject
of some unique featur~ which enables a
fount of knowledge to be explored, not
otherwise available, or not susceptible of
being otherwise encountered. It is this
general proposition which has led curriculum
builders to examine 'knowledge' or 'infor-
mation about the world' in order to see what
unique characteristics are exhibited and
whether they correspond to the division into
disciplines and subjects.
Peterson 1 talks about four main modes
of thought: the analytical, the empirical, the
moral and the aesthetic. Perhaps 'thought' is
too narrow to use in referring to areas which
include both the intuitive and the emotional;
but the distinctions are nevertheless drawn
between these four modes. Those suggested
by Phenix 2 as 'realms of meaning': sym-
bolics, empirics, aesthetics, ethics, synoptics
and synoetics, (the last being personal know-
ledge of an intuitive kind - more easily
acquired than communicated), becomes
translated by Professor Peters3 into: formal
logic and mathematics, physical sciences,
awareness and understanding of our own and
other people's minds, moral judgement and
awareness, aesthetic experience, religious
and philosophical.
The grounds for making these divisions
of knowledge is the claim that each belongs
to a distinct category which differs from
others in having its distinctive body of
'fundamental, ultimate or categoreal con-
cepts of a most general kind' with distinctive
syntax and tests for truth.
An apparent confusion arising from a
conviction we all share: that the world is
intercategoreal, that - for example - mathe-
matics is used by science, or formal logic by
philosophy and so on, may be easily set at
rest by pointing again to the claim: that
knowledge falls into distinctive categories,
which is not to say that the world divides its
activities into them. Life is inclined to be
philosophically untidy, our working every-
day knowledge strays through the categories,
mixing scientific and aesthetic issues
together and bringing philosophical and
moral considerations to further confuse or,
perhaps occasionally, to resolve. But this
does not in any way affect the original
categorisation of knowledge although it does
sound a warning, reminding us that when we
turn from philosophising to teaching, we
should remember that the world at large is
singularly unaware of knowledge categories
but with the criterion of 'usefulness', will
join together whatever knowledge is required
to satisfy desired ends.
Although few would wish to suggest the
seven categories as a curriculum, Hirst4 does
propose them as generative of objectives
upon which a curriculum could be based.
"If we want general education, then this
implies education in the distinct forms of
knowledge; to drop anyone of these would
be effectively to prevent further develop
ment in that field."
Here the argument appears to have
moved to a different plane, although it is
claimed that the seven categories must be
drawn upon to provide the kind of know-
ledge a liberal curriculum requires; there is
also a hint that this is necesary to maintain
knowledge itself. And this emphasises the
'knowledge' view of the curriculum as
opposed to a 'child development' view, or
the 'classical' as opposed to 'romantic' -
Denis Lawton's phrase.
The preservation-of-knowledge or con-
servation-of-knowledge view of the cur-
riculum is important in maintaining tradi-
tional values of scholarship but it may be
more applicable to specialised than to
general education. In devising a general
curriculum we need to give attention to how
children learn and how they fail to do so,
the curriculum itself is merely a scheme.
Even the stating of educationally desirable
objectives drawn from a curriculum plan in
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41 no way ensures their attainment. As Peters5points out -
"In particular it is assumed that, once
objective has been isolated, the valuative
questions have been settled and only
empirical questions remain about
means. But education is not like taking
a bus rather than a taxi to work. Usually
the values of the state of mastery
concerned are instantiated in the pro-
cess of learning. In thinking philoso-
phically for instance, there are values
immanent such as consistency, clarity, a
sense of relevance, humility and in-
dependence of mind. But the process of
learning to think philosophically instan-
tiates embryonically these values. The
skilled toolmaker works precisely,
patienty and with a real respect for the
properties of his material. He learns his
trade by constantly practising in a way
which instantiates, falteringly at first,
these very values. Thus the process of
education encapsulates aims".
And so we are left asking questions
about possible routes rather than objectives
and with the recognition that the forms of
knowledge can only be honoured if they are
built into the teaching process. In addition it
becomes clear that curriculum entry of a
school activity may be based as much upon
significance of a teaching process that it
embodies as upon its contribution to the
seven categories of knowledge.
The bid to include 'Art' among these
categories, that is made by quoting Herbert
Read6: Is Art a Form of Knowledge?, may
not be a direct reference to the seven
categories but is undoubtedly to be con-
sidered in curriculum building. Art, of
course, is included as one of the activities of
teh aesthetic category. The very existence of
such a category suggests a characteristic
common to those individual activities that
share the description 'aesthetic'. This
common feature it is suggested is the
'aesthetic experience'7, a quality not of
things but of our response to them and the
visual acts provide a channel for this ex-
perience, as also do music and literature.
Few would deny an initial place in the
curriculum to the aesthetic category in its
various manifestations, at least in early
schooling - perhaps until 13 years - but
eventually certain channels will be found to
be more or less open to individual students.
Some students will be reached through
literature or music or visual arts, some
through specific aspects of these, or through
various combinations of them, but even-
tually they will vary in their appeal to the
individual student and will be emphasised or
red uced according to individual
temperament.
The idea that art (visual art as practised
in school art rooms) is mandatory in the
curriculum is based upon a belief in every-
child-an-artist, an idea that is less and less
born out in fact as the age of innocence
passes and the task of expression becomes
more and more formidable to the growing
child. Art (in the specialised form already
indicated) may remain an open channel of
communication to some, it undoubtedly
does so for those who decide to adopt it as a
career, but its relevance, in its subject form,
to the generality of pupils is open to
question.
It is not, however, being suggested that
aesthetic category should be ignored in
terms of the visual arts, although the stan-
dard art room, or even art school (if we
recall recent controversy) have not been
wholly convincing. It is argued that a way of
finding alternative means to the visual
aesthetic experience must be sought.
The problem of the curriculum in its
pure form, that is, when forms of knowledge
can be recognised through the disciplines is
one that arises from the very logic of the
divisions. Such a curriculum observes a
structure which is largely irrelevant in terms
of use and learning method. It does not
follow a 'world of work' model which might
confer intelligibility through application, it
follows a scholastic model where intelligi-
bility is laboriously built up from first
principle.
In this respect the choice of such a
structure for a learning activity appears
arbitrary. To the pupil's question, 'Why am I
studying this?', the scholastic structure can
only answer, 'this is the way the subject!
discipline is built'. The world model struc-
ture, on the other hand, can answer the same
question by pointing to applications, to
needs, to choices and so on.
We shall return to the world structure
later but at this point is is necessary to
examine the other claimant for curriculum
legitimacy, design. It would be idle to
further define the term, since this has been
done adequately elsewhere and since dif-
ferences between concepts of design turn so
frequently to be matters of differing em-
phasis. If then we take the problem-solving
aspects of design, fitting a need as it were,
we must seek the unique feature - if any -
that this process has, which other forms-of-
knowledge have not.
We may ask 'What further dimension of
knowledge is reached? - what would such
knowledge be about? In what respects would
its tests-for-truth be unshared by other
forms, aesthetic or scientific? - Which of
its moral considerations are not served by
the moral form of knowledge? The questions
need only be asked to find the claim
untenable. Problem solving is procedural not
propositional as Hirst points out in his now
classic, answer to the problem-solving solu-
tion to educational matters. Hirst8. Problem
solving is a way of going about things, it
presupposes subject knowledge. Further-
more anyone who recommends problem-
solving as an educational ploy is hardly
innovatory - even if we ignore Dewey -
since most subjects have recognised the
worthwhileness of this approach in appro-
priate circumstances.
'But design is more than problem-
solving', it will be said and it is perhaps in
the difference between mere problem-solving
and design that we shall find the unique
feature required to satisfy the forms-of-
knowledge criterion. Professor Archer makes
the illuminating observation that design
deals with problems which cannot be
precisely defined9 and that the design pro-
cess is therefore one of progressively clarify-
ing the terms of the problem. This is an
important aspect of the design process and
one that designers (even children designers)
need to bear in mind, it may even help to
loosen up the rather rigid adherence to the
formal linear design approach now becoming
so popular, but does it confer the unique
quality we are looking for? In fact it cannot
be argued, other subjects than design include
progressive defi nition of terms, and analy-
tical procedures and such treatment of ideas
is freely made use of by the forms-of-
knowledge already given. This is actually
recognised in the proposals which recom-
mend extending design to all subjects: it is a
procedure they already share. The only
feature that design activities do not share
with other subjects of the curriculum or do
not find embodied in the existing forms-of-
knowledge, is the unique stage of world
changing known as realisation. 'World chang-
ing' may seem e"xtravagant when used to
describe the minor works of the school
workshop but the term does point up the
difference between describing the world - as
most school subjects do, prescribing a
change, as design does when the proposal is
left at the notional drawing stage, and
actually changing something to meet a pro-
posal. This event is different in kind from all
the others hitherto considered.
As to whether the working of materials
qualifies as a form-of-knowledge, in the
sense already given, may be open to dis-
cussion. White 10 decides against on the
grounds that one can imagine tool processes,
the cutting of timber, for example, and
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43 therefore no further knowledge is gained orno other knowledge is achieved by actually
doing the cutting since the action of cutting
is procedural. It occurs as an event in a series
of prescribed events. It makes no statement,
offers no proposition that something is the
case and so attracts no test for truth. This
could be countered by pointing out th~t it is
the nature of craft activities that the propo-
sition is expressed in the procedure. Wood is
cut in particular ways, worked to specific
sequence, because of a proposition about
fibrous materials.
Borax is applied in soldering because of
a proposition linking heating, oxydising and
bondi ng, and anneal ing recognises a propo-
sition about working, work hardening and
the effect of heat. In these examples the
tests for truth are largely empirical because
the proposition fits into the form of scien-
tific knowledge. But is there not in addition,
a knowing what it is like to make a tool
meet the resistance of working material,
adjusting tool aspect and force to produce
exactly what one wishes? No doubt it would
be possible to describe bowing a violin in
language dealing with angle of bow, vertical
force, direction of movement, fingering and
time base; or propositions could be made
about string vibrations and sound; or about
friction and resistance; but would any of this
amount to playing a violin? And in addition,
however detailed the account is made it
would not be a way of teaching to play,
there is an incommunicable element, an
aspect that cannot be put into words or
numbers. This is 'connoisseurship',
Polanyi's 11 term and it is - personal
knowledge - jn a sense that we build it up
through our own experience.
"In effect, to the extent which our
intelligence falls short of the ideal of
precise formalization, we act and see by
the light of unspecifiable knowledge and
must acknowledge that we accept the
verdict of our personal appraisal".
"What has been said of skills applies
equally to connoisseurship. The medical
diagnostician's skill is as much an art of
doing as it is an art of knowing. The
skill of wine tasting continuous with the
more actively muscular skills, like swim-
ming or riding a bicycle".
Polanyi coins the phrase 'tacit know-
ledge' to denote the special knowledge upon
which the perceptual motor skills depend
and it is argued here that once one has
shown that this kind of knowledge exists,
largely kinaesthetic though it is, it must be
admitted as a category, perhaps entitled
'Kinaesthetic'.
"The Kinaesthetic sense provides infor-
mation about the position of our limbs and
the pressures which we are exerting with
them. Without this internal, proprioceptive,
information no purposive controlled activity
would be possible. It provides the means for
control of movement and for "feed back" of
information about the movements made"12
in making this statement, Seymour - in
1966 - used quotation marks on 'feed back'
today we would omit them. The change is a
measure of our general recognition of
Kinaesthesis as a source of understanding.
In conclusion therefore there appears to
be no strong case for regarding Design or Art
as forms of knowledge in the philosophical
(Hirst) sense, but the realisation aspects of
each would appear to be candidates for an
eighth category - 'kinaesthetics'. And there-
fore in making an epistemological claim for
inclusion of Design in the curriculum, it is
the central feature of making and testing
that provides the unique quality not offered
by other forms of knowledge or their dis-
ciplines. Any 'mere procedure' criticism
levelled at the crafts - the procedural
criticisms - is even more strongly to be
levelled at the design process which has no
unique propositional content, nothing not to
be found in logic or mathematics.
It is only when the design process is
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Under construction now are two pendent
type light fittings consisting of a cluster of
cylindrical glass fibre shades. One for the
lounge and one for the dining room. The
dining room creates special problems as we
require a low level light over the table but
the ceiling rose is not convenient for this. An
interesting design has developed that will
balance out the light over the table area. The
light fittings have involved the two boys in
producing a scale model and:-
(1) Glass Fibre work for the shades
(2) Basic electrics to wire up
(3) Design problems associated with the
type of material and electricity, the
light and heat produced and the overall
effect on the atmosphere of the room
the fitting is trying to create.
At present the flat is ready for use
although quite a number of small jobs need
to be done.
We have purchased a small amount of
kitchen equipment and by borrowing some
more from the cookery room have all the
basic essentials to enable to flat to be used
by the girls.
From now until the end of term the
fifth year girls in twos will live in the flat for
two days, being completely independent,
going shopping, cooking, washing and
generally looking after themselves.
It would seem that at last the project is
near completion and that the girls will begin
to gain some benefit from it.
In future it is hoped that groups of
pupils will be able to use the flat for
homemaking lessons throughout the year
and that fifth year pupils will be able to live
in the flat for a week at a time before they
leave.
continued from page 43
seen as a totality, including as essential its
world changing or realisation that it makes
an educational case and educational good
sense. It is this practical craft element so
often ignored because of its workshop con-
nections or 'gentrified' into classroom
theorising that gives the touch of uniqueness
to the enterprise of designing in education.
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